Russia Can Use Huawei 5G to its Own International Advantage!
Introduction
Some Russian commentators have expressed concern that US and EU sanctions against Russia will enable China to use Huawei 5G technology to create a “China-centered technology order” in Eurasia – a so called Pax Sinica – with “worrying” and “global ramifications”.[1]
However, contrary to this view, Russia may be able to use the 5G situation to its own international advantage.
As I wrote in February 2019, Russia is presently in an unenviable position regarding 5G technology. Any security fears it has regarding Huawei 5G technology will be greater in the case of Western suppliers such as Ericsson and Nokia. I concluded that “Russia is likely to use Huawei hardware while attempting to ensure that Russian software is used wherever possible”.[2] However, while I noted “this will be no easy task”, it may in fact be becoming easier due to both technological and political developments.
On the technical side, increased virtualization of 5G infrastructure means that many functions now built into hardware when it is manufactured will increasingly be transferred to software. In simple terms, this will be ultimately be similar to buying a number of laptop computers and then deciding what software you want to install when connecting them to each other.
Huawei is seen as an efficient producer of 5G equipment and able to provide it at the world’s lowest cost, which is important for less developed countries and very important for the poorest countries which are able to benefit greatly from mobile telecommunications. However, Huawei’s quality standards — particularly software — have often been criticized. Russia does not have a good base for making telecommunications hardware, but it has a very high software capability and Huawei might benefit from this.
On the political side, the United States is putting pressure on other countries to refrain from using Huawei 5G equipment, and has been having some success because Huawei is seen as being ultimately under the control of the Chinese Communist Party and a probable agent for espionage and attacks on crucial infrastructure.
Moreover, a number of economic and trade tensions that existed at the end of 2019 have been exacerbated by the appearance of COVID 19 and the various responses to it. In particular, the economic lock-down policies adopted to some degree by most major countries to combat COVID 19 have resulted in great disruption and, even though no country was forced into adopting such policies, many are blaming China.
Russia might be seen by some countries as a more acceptable supplier of 5G software than China. This would be facilitated if Russia could adopt policies that make it seem less threatening to other countries.
What is 5G?
According to Doug Brake of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation:
“At one level, 5G is simply the next generation of wireless infrastructure. New generations of mobile come in waves, requiring changes throughout the network. The first generation of mobile telecommunications was focused purely on basic voice service. The next generation, 2G, was still focused on voice, but made the switch to digital standards and enabled text messaging. 3G then introduced data services, expanding the functionality beyond voice to include multimedia and limited Internet access. It was not until 4G that a full specification based on Internet Protocol allowed for functional mobile broadband, in turn serving as a platform for dizzying innovation in mobile applications. These waves of technological changes have come in roughly decade-long cycles: 1G mobile voice in the 1980s, 2G in the 1990s, 3G basic data in the 2000s, and 4G LTE data in the 2010s. In one sense, 5G is simply the next step in this cycle.”[3]
The “LTE” aspect of “4G LTE” refers to “long-term evolution” which is the optional “incremental and evolutionary” rollout of various 5G capabilities based on interim use of existing 4G infrastructure.[4] When this is done, the network is called “non-standalone” (NSA), in contrast to a new purpose built “standalone” network for 5G.
Lower latency (delay before transfer of data begins), faster speeds, higher data transfer capacity and greater flexibility mean 5G offers increased possibilities for machine-to-machine interaction or Internet of Things (IoT) and the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in many daily activities such as managing city infrastructure, autonomous vehicles and remote robots.
5G uses higher-frequency radio waves (electromagnetic spectrum) than its predecessors which also travel less distance. Thus, in addition to the commonly seen tall 4G mobile telecommunication cell towers (or those located on tall building and elevated geography), there will be many more small cell boxes distributed in any geographical area (for example, on street lighting poles) which connect to individual mobile devices and then, in turn, connect via radio waves to large cell towers etc.
This part of mobile telecommunications infrastructure is known as the Radio Access Network (RAN), and is at the “edge” of the network. These large cell towers are then connected via “backhaul” fibre-optic to the infrastructure “core” where data processing occurs. This data processing (routing of network traffic) is what allow various mobile devices to be connected to each other.
In comparison to 4G, more of the data processing in 5G can be done further from the “core” and closer to the “edge” in smaller data processing centres.
Putting the above basic idea into practice is complex, and involves numerous technical decisions. Moreover, international technical standards are still being developed.
As 5G technology continues to evolve, more processes are being “virtualized” by what is known as Network Function Virtualization (NFV). Rather than individual pieces of hardware being designed and manufactured to perform a few specific tasks, more general pieces of equipment are produced which can be centrally programmed with software to perform a wider variety of changeable tasks over the network. The acronym for this is vRAN.
That is, software-defined networking (SDN) techniques “essentially separate out the control over the routing of network traffic, and allows centralized software – rather than individually configured pieces of specialized hardware – to dynamically adjust the network”.[5]
RAN has several “subcategories”. In addition to the vRAN, one of these there is oRAN, or Open-RAN, which builds on vRAN to allow for hardware interoperability by separating hardware from software functions.[6]
The idea of oRAN is that instead of a specialized, integrated piece of equipment sourced and maintained from a single vendor (such as Huawei), vRAN could include a wider diversity of companies specializing in the software that runs aspects of the network, and generic hardware similar to high performance servers.”[7] Hardware becomes commoditized or commercial-off-the-shelf in a similar way to laptops, and system-wide software can then be independently chosen.
There is little immediate prospect of oRAN, but its potential is clear. On October 2019, “the director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, expressed optimism for vRAN technologies to give the United States a new advantage when it comes to supply-chain security and competitiveness, going so far as to imagine a future wherein our concerns about Huawei are merely a “blip” in the rear-view mirror.[8]
According to the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, “the type of RAN that ultimately dominates 5G rollout will depend on international consensus (since the network itself is so globalized).”[9]
The major producers of RAN equipment are Huawei, Ericsson, Nokia, ZTE and Samsung.[10] Most experts appear to concede that Huawei presently has a lead in 5G technology, but that Nokia and Ericsson will soon eliminate this.[11] Having said this, Huawei is often accused of have “poor security and engineering standards”.[12]
International Acceptance of Huawei 5G Equipment
Concerns about the security aspects of Huawei telecommunication equipment in the UK led to the establishment of the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC) in 2010, which is owned by Huawei but supervised by an Oversight Board which is chaired by the CEO of the UK’s National Cyber Security Center (NCSC). The Oversight Board’s deputy chair is a Huawei executive, and it has representatives from government and the UK telecommunications sector. [13]
The HCSEC’s fifth annual report in 2019 said that “further significant technical issues have been identified in Huawei’s engineering processes, leading to new risks in the UK telecommunications networks” and that “no material progress has been made by Huawei in the remediation of the issues reported last year, making it inappropriate to change the level of assurance from last year or to make any comment on potential future levels of assurance”.
The annual report added that “HCSEC’s work has continued to identify concerning issues in Huawei’s approach to software development bringing significantly increased risk to UK operators, which requires ongoing management and mitigation; “no material progress has been made on the issues raised in the previous 2018 report”.
Furthermore, the annual report said that the Oversight Board: “continues to be able to provide only limited assurance that the long-term security risks can be managed in the Huawei equipment currently deployed in the UK”; “advises that it will be difficult to appropriately risk-manage future products in the context of UK deployments, until the underlying defects in Huawei’s software engineering and cyber security processes are remediated”.
“At present, the Oversight Board has not yet seen anything to give it confidence in Huawei’s capacity to successfully complete the elements of its transformation programme that it has proposed as a means of addressing these underlying defects. The Board will require sustained evidence of better software engineering and cyber security quality verified by HCSEC and NCSC”. “Overall, the Oversight Board can only provide limited assurance that all risks to UK national security from Huawei’s involvement in the UK’s critical networks can be sufficiently mitigated long-term”.
Ian Levy, NCSC Technical Director, says “there are no absolutes in cyber security, and there’s no such thing as a 100% secure system. In the end, cyber security is all about risk management, judgement, and trying to make your adversaries’ lives harder”.[14] He adds that “nothing we can do can entirely remove risk in any telecoms network with any vendor (of equipment) and so our intent is to get the risk down to an acceptable level in all the different networks using all the different vendors”.[15]
On 28 January 2020 the UK Government announced that “high risk vendors” would be “excluded from sensitive ‘core’ parts of 5G and gigabit-capable networks”, and that there would be a “35% cap on high risk vendor access to non-sensitive parts of the network”.[16] “High risk vendors” were described as “those who pose greater security and resilience risks to UK telecoms networks”. While there was no direct mention of China or particular companies, Huawei was clearly the main target.
Australia has completely banned Huawei from participating in its 5G network. A basic technical reason has been put forward by the head of its Signals Directorate: “5G is not just fast data, it is also high-density connection of devices – human to human, human to machine and machine to machine – and finally it is much lower signal latency (faster speed of response). Historically, we have protected the sensitive information and functions at the core of our telecommunications networks by confining our high-risk vendors to the edge of our networks (where the end-users of such services are). But the distinction between core and edge collapses in 5G networks. That means that a potential threat anywhere in the network will be a threat to the whole network. In consultation with operators and vendors, we worked hard this year to see if there were ways to protect our 5G networks if high-risk vendor equipment was present anywhere in these networks. At the end of this process, my advice was to exclude high-risk vendors from the entirety of evolving 5G networks.”[17]
Many opponents of the use of Huawei equipment say that China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law obliges Chinese companies to assist the government in any espionage activity. Article 7 says “any organization or citizen shall support, assist, and cooperate with state intelligence work according to law”, while Article 14 says that “state intelligence work organs, when legally carrying forth intelligence work, may demand that concerned organs, organizations, or citizens provide needed support, assistance, and cooperation”.[18] This is taken to mean that Huawei will design its equipment so that it can be used by the Chinese government to spy on foreign users of that equipment.
US official policy on Huawei has been described as “scattershot”[19] by Brake of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF), with a “variety of different actors throughout the government doing what they can to limit Huawei in the United States – or even curtail its rise altogether”. Brake identifies the actions of the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC), as well as US trade policy, diplomacy, and legislation.
In November 2019, the FCC announced a policy to prohibit official financial subsidy money for high-cost rural 5G networks being spent to obtain equipment or services from a company considered to be a national security threat, specifically naming Huawei and ZTE.[20]
According to Brake, the US “has leveraged both import and export controls in an attempt to undermine Chinese wireless equipment manufacturers such as Huawei and ZTE”.[21]
A May 2019 US presidential “Executive Order”[22] gave “extremely broad authority for the administration to block the importation or use of risky 5G equipment”.[23]
On the export side, Huawei has been added to the Entity List of the US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security[24], with the result that “no company may sell US technology, software, or other items without a special license”. Nevertheless, according to Brake, “over 160 major US companies have applied for – and at least some have received – licenses to do business with Huawei.
Even though Huawei is on the Entity List, a 15 June 2020 US Department of Commerce press release says that it still wants is companies to cooperate with Huawei in “standards-development bodies” because of “US national security and foreign policy interests”.[25]
On the diplomacy side, the US has been very aggressive in expressing its views. In May 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that “Huawei is an instrument of the Chinese government”.[26] In December 2019, the US national security adviser, Robert O’Brien, told the Financial Times newspaper that: “It is somewhat shocking to us that folks in the UK would look at Huawei as some sort of commercial decision. 5G is a national security decision.”[27]
In February 2020, O’Brien said that: “We have evidence that Huawei has the capability secretly to access sensitive and personal information in systems it maintains and sells around the world.” national security adviser Robert O’Brien said.[28] However, no evident has been made public for this claim and some companies and experts are skeptical.[29]
US Deputy Assistant Secretary for Cyber and International Communications and Information Policy, has said that “there is no way that we can effectively mitigate the risk to having an untrustworthy vendor in the edge of the network”.[30]
According to Brake, numerous laws have been proposed, with two important one already implemented. The Secure and Trusted Communications Network Act of 2019[31], which became law in March 2020, prohibits use of US federal government funds “to purchase equipment from companies that pose a national security threat, and created a reimbursement program to remove and replace equipment in use that was manufactured by entities posing an unacceptable national security risk”.[32] Part of the National Defense Legislation Authorization Act means that, effective August 2020, the government can no longer use US government funds to purchase equipment from “covered” telecommunications companies (such as Huawei).[33]
On 30 June 2020, the BBC reported the UK’s Digital Secretary as saying that US sanctions are “likely to have an impact on the viability of Huawei as a provider for the 5G network”.[34]
Conclusion
In conclusion, 5G technology offers the prospect of very significant advances in the economic and social development of all countries, regardless of the present level of development. However, 5G technology is extremely complex and continues to evolve, and what exactly is best for one country may not be best for another.
Progressive “virtualization” of much 5G infrastructure will act to reduce the importance of particular hardware producers such as Huawei, and may allow Russia to play on its software strengths in much of the international market for 5G network products. Political developments associated with US pressure and China’s own foreign and domestic policies may also favor Russia, with a combination of off-the-shelf hardware and Russian software seen as less of a security threat than a whole network provided by one seller. This would be facilitated if Russia could adopt policies that make it seem less threatening to other countries.
[1] Alexander Gabuev, “Huawei’s courtship of Moscow leaves west in the cold”, Carnegie Moscow Center, 21 June 2020
[2] Jeff Schubert, “Russia’s Huawei 5G Conundrum”, Russian International Affairs Council, 11 February 2020
[3] Doug Brake, “A US National Strategy for 5G and Future Wireless Innovation”, Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF), April 2020
[4] “5G Tech Factsheet For Policymakers”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Spring 2020 Series. https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/5G_2.pdf
[5] Doug Brake, “A US National Strategy for 5G and Future Wireless Innovation”, Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF), April 2020
[6] “5G Tech Factsheet For Policymakers”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Spring 2020 Series. https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/5G_2.pdf
[7] Doug Brake, “A US National Strategy for 5G and Future Wireless Innovation”, Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF), April 2020
[8] Doug Brake, “A US National Strategy for 5G and Future Wireless Innovation”, Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF), April 2020
[9] 5G Tech Factsheet For Policymakers”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Spring 2020 Series. https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/5G_2.pdf
[10] 5G Tech Factsheet For Policymakers”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Spring 2020 Series. https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/5G_2.pdf
[11] “Expert says Huawei’s cyber risks can’t be mitigated in a 5G network”, Howard Solomon, IT World Canada, 15 June 2020. Reporting on an interview with Melissa Hathaway.
[12] Ian Levy, Ian Levy, Technical Director, UK National Cyber Security Center, “Security, complexity and Huawei; protecting the UK’s telecoms networks”, 22 February 2019
[13] “Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC) Oversight Board Annual Report”, 2019
[14] Ian Levy, Ian Levy, Technical Director, UK National Cyber Security Center, “Security, complexity and Huawei; protecting the UK’s telecoms networks”, 22 February 2019
[15] Ian Levy, Technical Director, UK National Cyber Security Center, “The future of telecoms in the UK”, 28 January 2020
[16] Press Release, UK Department of Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, “New plans to safeguard country’s telecoms network and pave way to fast, reliable and secure connectivity”, 28 January 2020
[17] Mike Burgess, Director-General ASD, speech to ASPI National Security Dinner, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 29 October 2018
[18] Murray Scot Tanner, “Beijing’s New National Intelligence Law: from Defence to Offence”, Lawfare, 20 July 2017 https://www.lawfareblog.com/beijings-new-national-intelligence-law-defense-offense
[19] Doug Brake, “A US National Strategy for 5G and Future Wireless Innovation”, Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF), April 2020
[20] US Federal Communications Commission, “Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain Through FCC Programs”, 26 November 2019
[21] Doug Brake, “A US National Strategy for 5G and Future Wireless Innovation”, Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF), April 2020
[22] “Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain”, 15 May 2019
[23] Doug Brake, “A US National Strategy for 5G and Future Wireless Innovation”, Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF), April 2020
[24] Sylwia A. Lis, Paul Amberg and Meghan Hamilton, “US Government Imposes Comprehensive Restrictions on Exports/Reexports to Huawei and its Affiliates and Issues Executive Order to Secure Information and Communications Technology and Services in the United States”, Baker & McKenzie, 19 May 2019
[25] Press Release, US Department of Commerce, “Commerce Clears Way for U.S. Companies to More Fully Engage in Tech Standards-Development Bodies”, 15 June 2020
[26] Doina Chiacu, “U.S.’s Pompeo says Huawei is an ‘instrument of Chinese government’ Reuters, 29 May 2019,
[27] Jon Porter, “UK defies US and refuses to ban Huawei from 5G networks”, The Verge, 28 January 2020
Demetri Sevastopulo, “US warns Boris Johnson over Huawei risks to UK citizens’ secrets”, Financial Times, 24 December 2019
[28] Bojan Pancevski, “U.S. Officials Say Huawei Can Covertly Access Telecom Networks”, Wall Street Journal, 12 February, 2020
[29] Bojan Pancevski, “U.S. Officials Say Huawei Can Covertly Access Telecom Networks”, Wall Street Journal, 12 February, 2020
[30] “LiveAtState with Economic and Business Affairs Bureau Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Strayer, Office of International Media Engagement, US Department of State, 29 April 2019
[31] H.R.4998 – Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019
[32] Doug Brake, “A US National Strategy for 5G and Future Wireless Innovation”, Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF), April 2020
[33] Doug Brake, “A US National Strategy for 5G and Future Wireless Innovation”, Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF), April 2020
[34] “Huawei: Ministers signal switch in policy over 5G policy”, BBC News, 30 June 2020