Heidi Crebo-Rediker, Centre for Geoeconomic Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, pod cast “Securing Ukraine’s Future – What Should the US Do?”, 31 January 2025, said that if territory of Ukraine containing critical minerals and rare earths “fall into Russian hands it falls by default into Chinese hands”

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QjwoybBQHog

The use of the word “default” would seem to reflect the view of many commentators that Russia and China are joined at the hip and are part of some axis of evil that also includes Iran and North Korea. This is highly misleading and may result in Western countries adopting self-defeating policies.

I last wrote about Russia-China relations in October 2022 – eight months after the invasion of Ukraine – when the Indian Government asked me to go to New Delhi and speak at an in-house seminar. I produced this report for the seminar: https://russianeconomicreform.ru/2022/10/china-russia-in-era-of-xi-and-putin/

A more recent report on Russia-China relation jointly produced the Russian International Affairs Council and Fudan University helps keep the issue in perspective.

In 2016 I returned to live and work in Russia after two years in Shanghai and began to regularly attend the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) annual two-day conference on Russia-China relations. Each time the conference would begin with prepared speeches by senior officials lauding the relationship but by the second day the informal panel discussions involving less senior officials and businesspeople would expose various cracks in the relationship with critical comments. Sometimes it was quite amusing to see someone, particularly Chinese, blurt-out something and then clam-up like a naughty school-boy who had spoken out-of-turn. Along with China’s Fudan University the RIAC would also produce a well-written and extensive annual report on Russia-China relations which often bluntly referred to difficulties in the relationship. The most recent report was released in Russian in October 2024, and in English on 25 January 2025.

https://russiancouncil.ru/en/activity/publications/russian-chinese-dialogue-the-2024-model/

https://russiancouncil.ru/papers/Russia-China-2024-Report94-En.pdf

The focus of the most recent report is on the role of Central Asia in Russia–China bilateral relations. The Central Asian region is described as “an integral component of Russia’s Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) concept and China’s Belt & Road Initiative (BRI)” and “the core of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)”.

The idea to create a Greater Eurasian Partnership was initially formulated in December 2015, when President Putin proposed to initiate consultations on the formation of an economic partnership between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), ASEAN, and the SCO.

I was teaching a Masters degree course on Russian foreign policy at the Higher School of Economics in 2018 – that is, nearly seven years ago – and wrote an article for the RIAC which describing the GEP as an “unreal idea” and a “fantasy”. See: http://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/columns/asian-kaleidoscope/reflecting-on-greater-eurasia-and-its-role-in-the-world/

I wrote that no one outside of Russia takes seriously the ideas of Sergei Karaganov which envisaged a Greater Eurasia with China as “a leading provider of financial and technological resources, and Russia leading in diplomacy and security building”. The Valdai Discussion Club, under the influence of Karaganov, was producing a series of reports titled, “Towards the Great Ocean”, which promoted the idea of Russia increasing looking eastward to the Pacific Ocean and China.

Not much has changed over the last 7 years – or maybe even 10 years!

The first RIAC / Fudan University report in 2015 said: “Тhe current status of the Russian-Chinese relations reflects the influence that major international, regional, and bilateral events have on the dynamic and character of the Russian-Chinese partnership. Such events include the Western confrontation with Russia.” “The Ukraine crisis has an objective role to play in the further strategic rapprochement between Russia and China, particularly when it comes to regional and global security. This crisis has served as an added factor in Russia’s general pivot to the East (China). Despite maintaining neutrality on the Ukraine conflict, Beijing has nonetheless taken a tough position against the Western media’s anti-Russian campaign, and it has officially distanced itself from the West’s economic sanctions against Russia.”

The 2015 report then went on to claim that “the bond between Moscow and Beijing on the global and regional stages will serve as basis for creating a ‘non-American’ world, which is particularly important for Russia in light of its growing confrontation with the U.S. and attempts to isolate it.

Russian-Chinese regional cooperation in Eurasia is increasingly moving into the sphere of jointly promoting three major projects”:

The development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO); the development of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB part of the BRI), and the development of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

“Both countries have said that the opportunity is arising for these megaprojects to strategically converge in Eurasia”.

In fact, I first wrote about these “three major projects” in 2017 in “New Eurasian Age: China’s Silk Road and the EAEU in SCO Space”, and my scepticism was summarised by my subtitle “Noodles and Meatballs in a Breaking Bowel”. See: https://russianeconomicreform.ru/2017/04/chinas-silk-road-and-the-eaeu-in-sco-space/

The RIAC 2024 report says that “Moscow and Beijing both view the current world order as unfair, irrational and flawed. However, some differences remain in their understanding of how these problems could be resolved. Russia is looking to establish a new multipolar world order where the West would play a significantly diminished role, and, as Chinese scholars believe, is ready to advance its interests by any means. The PRC, however, considers that the existing world order can be carefully sustained through reforms and gradual improvement. In Beijing’s worldview, competition can and should be mutually complementary and serve to jointly preserve world peace and support international development.”

“Concerning the Ukraine conflict, Russia and China have some common ground, but their positions are not identical. For instance, China has more than once spoken in favor of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Chinese experts point out that not everybody in China share the view that the root cause of the security architecture crisis in Europe is the expansion of NATO to the East and the ignoring of Russia’s national interests by alliance member countries, although it dominates the official narrative.”

“The Joint Statement between China and Russia on Deepening the Relations of Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Engagement made following Putin’s state visit to Beijing in May 2024, notes that Russia continues to interact with China’s Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) to couple it with plans for developing the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and in the context of implementing agreements on the simultaneous and coordinated development of the Greater Eurasian Partnership. The agreed coupling formula allows the parties to develop integration projects in parallel without creating interdependences between them. This arrangement is directly supported by the leadership of the two countries, ensuring their resilience.”

“The different goals of the partners are also a challenge to the plans for coupling the EAEU with the BRI. Whereas China seeks to create a free trade area (FTA) and open up markets, the EAEU is still wary of engaging in unrestricted free trade with the PRC that could be too risky due to uncertain demand prospects for EAEU made products considering lower prices for Chinese goods and possible secondary sanctions that could be imposed by the West, impeding the development of banking and financial cooperation.”

Russian and Chinese contributors to the RIAC report have differing “visions” for the future.

The Russian “vision” is that:

“Today, the region is a key component of Russia’s Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) concept. In fact, the GEP is a tool for creating a ‘scale effect’ for integration processes and economic and social development in Eurasia. This lens implies, first of all, the establishment of a comprehensive security architecture across Eurasia based on deep interdependence of participating states as well as extensive regional connectivity, and also on the sustainable security concept, which includes both traditional and new dimensions. Thus Central Asia is becoming part of a large and sustainable Eurasian region in Russian foreign policy priorities.”

“It is symptomatic that in the last updated version of the Russian Foreign Policy Concept, Central Asia is not treated as a stand-alone region, but as part of a larger space. The document defines Russia’s priority partners as EAEU and CIS member states that maintain friendly relations with Russia. Furthermore, the strategy states Moscow’s commitment to leverage the economic potential of the good neighbor policy, primarily with EAEU members and countries seeking to develop economic ties with Russia, to widen the perimeter of integration in Eurasia. Therefore, any activity in this space is seen through a functional rather than a “country” lens, which emphasizes the importance of economic engagement. So, the concept of sustainable security appears to be particularly aligned with Russian interests in Eurasia and Central Asia as it combines both strategic and socio-economic components.”

The Chinese vision is that:

“In this context, more cooperation mechanisms appear between the region’s governments and their partners in the 5+1 format. By the end of 2023, the five Central Asian states had established such mechanisms of engagement with China, the United States and a number of other countries. The diversified and balanced 5+1 diplomacy enables Central Asian states to have an equitable dialogue with global powers, shape a common concept of regional development, promote their national interests in a practical fashion and even rely on collective power to improve their common negotiating position on some issues.”

“China’s strategy in Central Asia rests on three pillars of China–Central Asia relations:

1) a comprehensive strategic partnership, 2) building the community of common destiny, and 3) cooperation within the BRI.”

“According to Chinese experts, the Ukraine conflict has led to high inflation, significant energy and food crises, increased poverty and unusual security issues in the region, creating governance problems at different levels and eroding the capability for crisis management.”

“In this respect, the SCO should not only support the creation of 5+1 mechanisms between Central Asia and major powers in the Organizations, but also to uphold the key position of Central Asia in the SCO and expand the scope of cooperation by promoting the BRI.” “It would be also useful to explore options for creating a new Eurasian regional governance system based on the SCO.”

The 2024 RIAC report concludes and recommends the following:

“After the dissolution of the Soviet Union Moscow claimed the role of the guarantor of security and political stability for Central Asia.

“China has always regarded Central Asia as a single region and a separate focus area of the political and economic cooperation. Today, Beijing prefers to develop it on the 5+1 basis. Chinese experts note that the dialogue has three objectives: build the community of common destiny with the region’s countries, involve Central Asia into projects under the BRI, and develop bilateral strategic partnerships.”

“Therefore, according to the Russian side, there is an increasing need to coordinate Russian and Chinese activities in Central Asia both in economic and political spheres. Today, Russia sees Central Asia as a key element of the Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP). In its turn, the GEP can be regarded as a tool for sustaining macroregional sustainable security, going beyond the military and political aspect to encompass energy, social, environmental, economic and other dimensions.”

“For China, the region mostly holds economic significance, judging by policy speeches of President Xi Jinping and joint statements following summit meetings. Chinese analysts do not view the 5+1 cooperation with Central Asia as part of the GEP.”

“According to Russian experts, the CSTO and SCO can become instruments for maintaining strategic and non-strategic security in Eurasia if they are regarded as complementing each other. In this case, the CSTO would be the designated guarantor of the military-political cooperation between Russia, Belarus and Central Asian states, while the SCO would be used to discuss new components of sustainability alongside traditional threats and the classic trio of “-isms”.

“Chinese experts believe that Central Asia should remain the key element of the organization and use the 5+1 model to engage with major powers that are members of the SCO.”

“Compared to their Russian counterparts, Chinese experts specify a more detailed list of problems facing the SCO. In their view, the external challenges include the precarious situation in Afghanistan and the politicalization of the organization’s activities by the US and the EU amid Belarus and Russia’s involvement in the Ukraine conflict.”

“Yet, what appears more serious to the Chinese side are the SCO’s internal challenges arising primarily from the membership expansion, which has increased the number of regional security issues, intensified political communications across the SCO space, and made decision-making more complicated.”

“Chinese experts also note that the SCO still has areas of political instability as evidenced by recent public disturbances in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Pakistan, and rising social tensions. The latter are seen by the Chinese side as the consequences of the Ukraine crisis affecting the food and socio-economic security of developing economies.”

“Russia develops its economic relations with Central Asia mostly through various multilateral frameworks, such as the EAEU (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan) or the CIS free trade area (Tajikistan). This system allows Russia to trade with the region’s countries on a duty-free (or almost duty-free) basis. The patterns and composition of Russia’s economic ties with individual countries of Central Asia depend on the economic strength of the partners.”

“China builds its economic links with Central Asian states mostly on a bilateral basis, including their involvement in the BRI. The fast-developing economic cooperation is focused on the energy sector. In the context of sanctions, the energy sector plays an increasing role in the economic cooperation between Russia and Central Asia. Moscow seeks to increase exports of crude oil and natural gas to Central Asia and China, including via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.”

“Russian experts emphasize that in 2022-2024, the EAEU has proved itself to be a fully functional integration framework readily adaptable to external shocks. While the EAEU has shown better trade and economic connectivity than the CIS and the SCO. Further development of the EAEU should remain among the top priorities for the Russian economic policy.”